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In a 1986 conversation with Robert Maggiori (published in English 
in Negotiations, Columbia University Press, 1995), the French 
philosopher Gilles Delenze cautioned against regarding Michel 
Foucault as a sort of "intellectual guru." Instead, in defiance of a 
trend whose momentum has yet ceased to abate, he insists on 
situating Foucault in a larger conversation—with the theorists that 
were his contemporaries, with the problems in his work, and with 
himself. A Foucault lecture, then, is seen to resemble less a sermon 
than it does a concer t—the performance of "a solois t 
'accompanied' by everyone else." In spite of that caveat, Deleuze 
concludes, simply, that "Foucault gave wonderful lectures." 
This assertion of Foucault's oratorical acumen will surprise 
few who have read, for example, his inaugural lecture at the College 
de France in 1970 ("The Order of Discourse"). Even less surprising 
is that some of his lectures prove better than others. As we are 
reminded by the editor of Semiotext(e)'s Fearless Speech (a 
collection of talks delivered as part of a 1983 Berkeley seminar 
entitled "Discourse and Truth") these transcribed lectures do not 
reflect Foucault's notes or intentions, and, being published after 
his death, lack his imprimatur. And while this may partially account 
for their occasional flatness, they are further hindered by having 
to stand on their own, without the contextualization necessary to 
animate their themes. Fearless Speech can, however, come alive, 
if regarded as an index of a crucial turning point in the development 
of Foucault's thought. For, after the publication of the introductory 
volume of the landmark History of Sexuality, Foucault found 
himself hemmed in by his relentless analysis of power and 
knowledge, in which the two themes seemed to intersect in a 
structural gridlock. It took Foucault eight years to rethink that 
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stalemate, as he sought out a third dimension that would revive 
the machinery of this thought. Fearless Speech is evidence of that 
fruitful process of negotiation. 
The lectures that make up Fearless Speech take as their central 
concern the question of the relation of speakers to truth, and 
specifically antiquity's concept of parrhesia (for which Foucault 
suggests "free speech" as a possible translation). Traditionally, 
the practice of parrhesia implied criticism of authority from a 
standpoint where belief and truth coincided; it fulfilled an 
obligation toward truth in spite of the risks such critique engenders. 
Parrhesia thus implied a series of relationships not only to truth 
and to the others against whom critique was levied, but also to the 
self—as the entity that risks danger by the expression of belief. 
Foucault is intent to identify the point at which parrhesia 
becomes problematic, where the relation between speech and truth 
begins to provoke concern; he locates that point in Euripedes' 
differing treatment of the phenomenon in Ion and Orestes. In the 
former—the most crucial parrhesiastic play—Euripedes stresses 
the human agency implied by parrhesia. In Ion, Apollo conceals 
the truth and thereby calls into question its Delphic origin: "truth 
is no longer disclosed by the gods to human beings (as at Delphi), 
but is disclosed to human beings by human beings through Athenian 
parrhesia" (38). Yet by the time of Orestes, parrhesia comes into 
crisis. Political misgivings undermine its critical function, and the 
compatibility of such truth with democracy is questioned. 
As a negative connotation of parrhesia emerges in Orestes, 
"there is a new problematization of the relations between verbal 
activity, education, freedom, power, and the existing political 
institutions which marks a crisis in the way freedom of speech is 
understood in Athens" (73-4). Euripedes here acknowledges that 
parrhesia and democracy may very well be at odds: if truth is 
disclosed by the parrhesiastic activities of citizens, what is to 
prevent the proliferation of those various beliefs into mere chatter, 
with the outcome of political chaos? Foucault diagnoses other 
instances of this concern in the texts of Isocrates and the Pseudo-
Xenophon known as the "Old Oligarch," which depict parrhesia 
as the domain of vulgar persons and flatterers. The connection 
between parrhesiastic freedom of speech and choice of lifestyle 
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likewise becomes an issue for Plato in The Republic, and this 
relation reaches its greatest intensity in Socraticparrhesia: Socrates 
serves as the interlocutor whose function is to test the relationship 
between what citizens say and how they live. The original 
parrhesiastic negotiation—embodied in the vertical relation 
between critic and king—is displaced onto the basic horizontal 
encounter between two human beings. 
Thus are the initial epistemological and political grounds of 
parrhesia—the stability of belief and the impact of that belief on 
the organization of the community—complemented by a third, 
e thical , d imension. In the process that Foucaul t cal led 
subj edification, the apparently seamless reciprocity of knowledge 
and power is potentially ruptured by the subject's capacity to bring 
force to bear on itself. Elsewhere, Foucault more thoroughly depicts 
various "clinical techniques" through which the subject develops 
a relation to itself through self-evaluation and self-testing. 
Parrhesia w just such a technique: it constitutes the subject not by 
mere renunciation, but rather through this sovereign and positive 
process that generates the subject's ethical machinery. One needn't 
"take up a position or role towards oneself as that of a judge 
pronouncing a verdict. One can comport oneself towards oneself 
in the role of a technician, or a craftsman, of an artist, who from 
time to time stops working, examines what he is doing, reminds 
himself of the rules of his art, and compares these rules with what 
he has achieved thus far" (166). In this possibility Foucault seeks 
relief from the apparently totalitarian knowledge-power nexus he 
depicted in such works as Discipline and Punish and History of 
Sexuality, Volume One, overcoming the structural and instrumental 
limitations of those analyses through a shift to the ethical plane. 
While the densest and most enriching passages of Fearless 
Speech al lude to the profound intervention the study of 
subjectification promised to make, they nonetheless fall far short 
of the greatness attained by the other works for which Foucault is 
adored—the swashbuckling and revealing interviews, for example, 
or the shimmering bravado passages that pronounced the 
overcoming of man (at the close of the Order of Things) or that 
inverted our most basic ideas about the relationship between sex 
and sexuality ("Right of Death and Power Over Life"). While the 
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self-assuredness of those texts can be exhilarating, Fearless Speech 
offers a very different Foucault—one who, puzzling through an 
enormous problem that is at once intellectual and personal, steps 
methodically, even cautiously, through an argument that is 
necessarily part of an exploratory mission. Fearless Speech is not 
exactly timid, but it has to content itself with pointing toward the 
robustness of a project that far exceeds this modest but slickly 
packaged volume. Its title thus better describes its theme than its 
content. For in these lectures Foucault is not fearless, but, rather, 
guardedly optimistic about the potential—to this day, awaiting its 
full realization by his accompanists—of this radical redirection of 
his thought. 
